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 Globalization is changing the way we argue about justice. Not so long ago, 
in the heyday of social democracy, disputes about justice presumed what I shall 
call a “Keynesian-Westphalian frame”. Typically played out within modern ter-
ritorial states, arguments about justice were assumed to concern relations among 
fellow citizens, to be subject to debate within national publics, and to contemplate 
redress by national states. This was true for each of two major families of justice 
claims, claims for socioeconomic redistribution and claims for legal or cultural 
recognition. At a time when the Bretton Woods system of international capital 
controls facilitated Keynesian economic steering at the national level, claims for 
redistribution usually focused on economic inequities within territorial states. 
Appealing to national public opinion for a fair share of the national pie, claim-
ants sought intervention by national states in national economies. Likewise, in 
an era still gripped by a Westphalian political imaginary, which sharply distin-
guished “domestic” from “international” space, claims for recognition generally 
concerned internal status hierarchies. Appealing to the national conscience for an 
end to nationally institutionalized disrespect, claimants pressed national govern-
ments to outlaw discrimination and accommodate differences among citizens. In 
both cases, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was assumed. Whether the matter 
concerned redistribution or recognition, class differentials or status hierarchies, 
it went without saying that the unit within which justice applied was the modern 
territorial state.1
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 To be sure, there were always exceptions. Occasionally, famines and genocides 
galvanized public opinion across borders. And some cosmopolitans and anti-im-
perialists sought to promulgate globalist views.2 But these were exceptions that 
proved the rule. Relegated to the sphere of “the international”, they were subsumed 
within a problematic that was focused primarily on matters of security, as opposed 
to justice. The effect was to reinforce, rather than to challenge, the Keynesian-
Westphalian frame. That framing of disputes about justice generally prevailed by 
default from the end of the Second World War through the 1970s. 
 Although it went unnoticed at the time, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame gave 
a distinctive shape to arguments about social justice. Taking for granted the modern 
territorial state as the appropriate unit, and its citizens as the pertinent subjects, 
such arguments turned on what precisely those citizens owed one another. In the 
eyes of some, it sufficed that citizens be formally equal before the law; for others, 
equality of opportunity was also required; for still others, justice demanded that all 
citizens gain access to the resources and respect they needed in order to be able 
to participate on a par with others, as full members of the political community. 
The argument focused, in other words, on what should count as a just ordering of 
social relations within a society. Engrossed in disputing the “what” of justice, the 
contestants apparently felt no necessity to dispute the “who”. With the Keynesian-
Westphalian frame securely in place, it went without saying that the “who” was 
the national citizenry. 
 Today, however, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is losing its aura of self-
evidence. Thanks to heightened awareness of globalization, and to post-Cold War 
geopolitical instabilities, many observe that the social processes shaping their 
lives routinely overflow territorial borders. They note, for example, that decisions 
taken in one territorial state often impact the lives of those outside it, as do the 
actions of transnational corporations, international currency speculators, and large 
institutional investors. Many also note the growing salience of supranational and 
international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, and of trans-
national public opinion, which flows with supreme disregard for borders through 
global mass media and cybertechnology. The result is a new sense of vulnerability 
to transnational forces. Faced with global warming, the spread of AIDS, interna-
tional terrorism, and superpower unilateralism, many believe that their chances for 
living good lives depend at least as much on processes that trespass the borders 
of territorial states as on those contained within them.
 Under these conditions, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame no longer goes 
without saying. For many, it is no longer axiomatic that the modern territorial state 
is the appropriate unit for thinking about issues of justice. Nor that the citizens 
 2. It might be assumed that, from the perspective of the Third World, Westphalian premises would 
have appeared patently counterfactual. Yet it is worth recalling that the great majority of anti-imperia-
lists sought to achieve independent Westphalian states of their own. In contrast, only a small minority 
consistently championed justice within a global frame–for reasons that are entirely understandable.
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of such states are the pertinent subjects. The effect is to destabilize the previous 
structure of political claims making-and therefore to change the way we argue 
about social justice.
 This is true for both major families of justice claims. In today’s world, claims 
for redistribution increasingly eschew the assumption of national economies. 
Faced with transnationalized production, the outsourcing of jobs, and the associ-
ated pressures of the “race to the bottom”, once nationally focused labor unions 
look increasingly for allies abroad. Inspired by the Zapatistas, meanwhile, im-
poverished peasants and indigenous peoples link their struggles against despotic 
local and national authorities to critiques of transnational corporate predation and 
global neoliberalism. Finally, WTO protestors directly target the new governance 
structures of the global economy, which have vastly strengthened the ability of 
large corporations and investors to escape the regulatory and taxation powers of 
territorial states. 
 In the same way, movements struggling for recognition increasingly look be-
yond the territorial state. Under the umbrella slogan “women’s rights are human 
rights”, for example, feminists throughout the world are linking struggles against 
local patriarchal practices to campaigns to reform international law. Meanwhile, 
religious and ethnic minorities, who face discrimination within territorial states, 
are reconstituting themselves as diasporas and building transnational publics 
from which to mobilize international opinion. Finally, transnational coalitions of 
human-rights activists are seeking to build new cosmopolitan institutions, such 
as the International Criminal Court, which can punish state violations of human 
dignity. 
 In such cases, disputes about justice are exploding the Keynesian-Westphalian 
frame. No longer addressed exclusively to national states or debated exclusively 
by national publics, claimants no longer focus solely on relations among fellow 
citizens. Thus, the grammar of argument has altered. Whether the issue is distri-
bution or recognition, disputes that used to focus exclusively on the question of 
what is owed as a matter of justice to community members now turn quickly into 
disputes about who should count as a member and which is the relevant community. 
Not just “the what” but also “the who” is up for grabs.
 Today, in other words, arguments about justice assume a double guise. On 
the one hand, they concern first-order questions of substance, just as before: How 
much economic inequality does justice permit, how much redistribution is required, 
and according to which principle of distributive justice?  What constitutes equal 
respect, which kinds of differences merit public recognition, and by which means? 
But above and beyond such first-order questions, arguments about justice today 
also concern second-order, meta-level questions: what is the proper frame within 
which to consider first-order questions of justice? Who are the relevant subjects 
entitled to a just distribution or reciprocal recognition in the given case? Thus, it 
is not only the substance of justice, but also the frame, which is in dispute. 
 The result is a major challenge to our theories of social justice. Preoccupied 
largely with first-order issues of distribution and/or recognition, these theories have 
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so far failed to develop conceptual resources for reflecting on the meta-issue of 
the frame. As things stand, therefore, it is by no means clear that they are capable 
of addressing the double character of problems of justice in a globalizing age.  
 In this lecture, I shall propose a strategy for thinking about the problem of 
the frame. I shall argue, first, that in order to deal satisfactorily with this problem, 
the theory of justice must become three-dimensional, incorporating the political 
dimension of representation, alongside the economic dimension of distribution 
and the cultural dimension of recognition. I shall also argue, second, that the po-
litical dimension of representation should itself be understood as encompassing 
three levels. The combined effect of these two arguments will be to make visible 
a third question, beyond those of the “what” and the “who”, which I shall call 
the question of the “how”. That question, in turn, inaugurates a paradigm shift: 
what the Keynesian-Westphalian frame cast as the theory of social justice must 
now become a theory of postwestphalian democratic justice.
1. FOR A THREE-DIMENSIONAL THEORY OF JUSTICE: ON THE SPECI-
FICITY OF THE POLITICAL
 Let me begin by explaining what I mean by justice in general and by its po-
litical dimension in particular. In my view, the most general meaning of justice is 
parity of participation. According to this radical-democratic interpretation of the 
principle of equal moral worth, justice requires social arrangements that permit 
all to participate as peers in social life. Overcoming injustice means dismantling 
institutionalized obstacles that prevent some people from participating on a par 
with others, as full partners in social interaction. Previously, I have analyzed 
two distinct kinds of obstacles to participatory parity, which correspond to two 
distinct species of injustice. On the one hand, people can be impeded from full 
participation by economic structures that deny them the resources they need in 
order to interact with others as peers; in that case they suffer from distributive 
injustice or maldistribution. On the other hand, people can also be prevented from 
interacting on terms of parity by institutionalized hierarchies of cultural value that 
deny them the requisite standing; in that case they suffer from status inequality 
or misrecognition. In the first case, the problem is the class structure of society, 
which corresponds to the economic dimension of justice. In the second case, the 
problem is the status order, which corresponds to the cultural dimension. In modern 
capitalist societies, the class structure and the status order do not neatly mirror 
each other, although they interact causally. Rather, each has some autonomy vis-à-
vis the other. As a result, misrecognition cannot be reduced to a secondary effect 
of maldistribution, as some economistic theories of distributive justice appear to 
suppose. Nor, conversely, can maldistribution be reduced to an epiphenomenal 
expression of misrecognition, as some culturalist theories of recognition tend to 
assume. Thus, neither recognition theory alone nor distribution theory alone can 
provide an adequate understanding of justice for capitalist society. Only a two-
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dimensional theory, encompassing both distribution and recognition, can supply 
the necessary levels of social-theoretical complexity and moral-philosophical 
insight. 
 That, at least, is the view of justice I have defended in the past.3 And this two-
dimensional understanding of justice still seems right to me as far as it goes. But 
I now believe that it does not go far enough. Distribution and recognition could 
appear to constitute the sole dimensions of justice only insofar as the Keynesian-
Westphalian frame was taken for granted. Once the question of the frame becomes 
subject to contestation, the effect is to make visible a third dimension of justice, 
which was neglected in my previous work–as well as in the work of many other 
philosophers.4 
 The third dimension of justice is the political. Of course, distribution and 
recognition are themselves political in the sense of being contested and power-laden; 
and they have usually been seen as requiring adjudication by the state. But I mean 
political in a more specific, constitutive sense, which concerns the constitution of 
the state’s jurisdiction and the decision rules by which it structures contestation. 
The political in this sense furnishes the stage on which struggles over distribution 
and recognition are played out. Establishing criteria of social belonging, and thus 
determining who counts as a member, the political dimension of justice specifies 
 3. Nancy Fraser, “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and 
Participation”, in Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philo-
sophical Exchange, trans. Joel Golb, James Ingram, and Christiane Wilke (London: Verso, 2003).
 4. The neglect is especially glaring in the case of theorists of justice who subscribe to liberal 
or communitarian philosophical premises. In contrast, deliberative democrats, agonistic democrats, and 
republicans have sought to theorize the political. But most of these theorists have had relatively little 
to say about the relation between democracy and justice; and none has conceptualized the political as 
a dimension of justice. Among liberals, see, for example, Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 
2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10:4 (Fall 1981): 283-345; John Rawls, 
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); and Political Liberalism 
(Columbia University Press, 1993). Among communitarians, see Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A 
Study in Moral Theory  (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and Michael Sandel, 
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Among delibe-
rative democrats, see, for example, Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity 
in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, 
Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1996), Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts 
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Cambridge MA: The MIT 
Press, 1996). Among agonistic democrats, see, William Connolly The Terms of Political Discourse 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) and Identity/Difference: Negotiations of Political Paradox 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991) and Bonnie Honig, Political Theory and the Displacement of 
Politics  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political (Lon-
don: Verso, 1993); and James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). Among republicans see, Philip Pettit, “Freedom 
as Antipower”, Ethics 106, 3 (1996): 576-604. Quentin Skinner, “The Republican Ideal of Political 
Liberty”, in Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli 
(Cambridge University Press, 1990). Exceptions are Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom  (New 
York: Anchor Books, 1999) and Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton 
University Press, 1990).
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the reach of those other dimensions: it tells us who is included, and who excluded, 
from the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and reciprocal recognition. 
Establishing decision rules, likewise, the political dimension sets the procedures for 
staging and resolving contests in both the economic and the cultural dimensions: 
it tells us not only who can make claims for redistribution and recognition, but 
also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated. 
 Centered on issues of membership and procedure, the political dimension of 
justice is concerned chiefly with representation. At one level, which pertains to 
the boundary-setting aspect of the political, representation is a matter of social 
belonging; what is at issue here is inclusion in, or exclusion from, the community 
of those entitled to make justice claims on one another. At another level, which 
pertains to the decision-rule aspect, representation concerns the procedures that 
structure public processes of contestation; what is at issue here are the terms on 
which those included in the political community air their claims and adjudicate 
their disputes. At both levels, the question can arise as to whether the relations 
of representation are just. One can ask: Do the boundaries of the political com-
munity wrongly exclude some who are actually entitled to representation? Do the 
community’s decision rules accord equal voice in public deliberations and fair 
representation in public decision-making to all members? Such issues of repre-
sentation are specifically political. Conceptually distinct from both economic and 
cultural questions, they cannot be reduced to the latter, although, as we shall see, 
they are inextricably interwoven with them. 
 To say that the political is a conceptually distinct dimension of justice, not 
reducible to the economic or the cultural, is also to say that it can give rise to a 
conceptually distinct species of injustice. Given the view of justice as participa-
tory parity, this means that there can be distinctively political obstacles to parity, 
not reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, although (again) interwoven 
with them. Such obstacles arise from the political constitution of society, as op-
posed to the class structure or status order. Grounded in a specifically political 
mode of social ordering, they can only be adequately grasped through a theory 
that conceptualizes representation, along with distribution and recognition, as one 
of three fundamental dimensions of justice.
 If representation is the defining issue of the political, then the characteristic 
political injustice is misrepresentation. Misrepresentation occurs when political 
boundaries and/or decision rules function to wrongly deny some people the possibility 
of participating on a par with others in social interaction–including, but not only, 
in political arenas. Far from being reducible to maldistribution or misrecognition, 
misrepresentation can occur even in the absence of the latter injustices, although 
it is usually intertwined with them.
 At least two different levels of misrepresentation can be distinguished. Insofar 
as political decision rules wrongly deny some of the included the chance to partici-
pate fully, as peers, the injustice is what I call ordinary-political misrepresentation. 
Here, where the issue is intraframe representation, we enter the familiar terrain of 
political science debates over the relative merits of alternative electoral systems. 
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Do single-member-district, winner-take-all, first-past-the-post systems unjustly 
deny parity to numerical minorities? And if so, is proportional representation or 
cumulative voting the appropriate remedy?5 Likewise, do gender-blind rules, in 
conjunction with gender-based maldistribution and misrecognition, function to 
deny parity of political participation to women? And if so, are gender quotas an 
appropriate remedy?6 Such questions belong to the sphere of ordinary-political 
justice, which has usually been played out within the Keynesian-Westphalian 
frame.
 Less obvious, perhaps, is a second level of misrepresentation, which concerns 
the boundary-setting aspect of the political. Here the injustice arises when the 
community’s boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people 
from the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice. In such 
cases, misrepresentation takes a deeper form, which I shall call misframing. The 
deeper character of misframing is a function of the crucial importance of framing 
to every question of social justice. Far from being of marginal importance, frame-
setting is among the most consequential of political decisions. Constituting both 
members and nonmembers in a single stroke, this decision effectively excludes the 
latter from the universe of those entitled to consideration within the community 
in matters of distribution, recognition, and ordinary-political representation. The 
result can be a serious injustice. When questions of justice are framed in a way 
that wrongly excludes some from consideration, the consequence is a special kind 
of meta-injustice, in which one is denied the chance to press first-order justice 
claims in a given political community. The injustice remains, moreover, even when 
those excluded from one political community are included as subjects of justice in 
another–as long as the effect of the political division is to put some relevant aspects 
of justice beyond their reach. Still more serious, of course, is the case in which 
one is excluded from membership in any political community. Akin to the loss of 
what Hannah Arendt called “the right to have rights”, that sort of misframing is 
a kind a “political death”.7 Those who suffer it may become objects of charity or 
benevolence. But deprived of the possibility of authoring first-order claims, they 
become non-persons with respect to justice. 
 5. Lani Guinier, The Tyranny of the Majority (New York: The Free Press, 1994). Robert Rit-
chie and Steven Hill, “The Case for Proportional Representation”, in Whose Vote Counts? ed. Robert 
Ritchie and Steven Hill (Boston: Beacon Press, 2001) 1-33.
 6. Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Shirin M. Rai, 
“Political Representation, Democratic Institutions and Women’s Empowerment: The Quota Debate 
in India”, in Rethinking Empowerment: Gender and Development in a Global/Local World, ed. Jane 
L. Parpart, Shirin M. Rai and Kathleen Staudt (New York: Routledge, 2002), 133-145. T. Gray, 
“Electoral Gender Quotas: Lessons from Argentina and Chile”, Bulletin of Latin American Research 
21, 1 (2003): 52-78. Mala Htun, “Is Gender Like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity 
Groups”. Perspectives on Politics 2, 3 (2004), 439-458.
 7. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace 1973), 269-
284.
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 It is the misframing form of misrepresentation that globalization has recently 
begun to make visible. Earlier, in the heyday of the postwar welfare state, with the 
Keynesian-Westphalian frame securely in place, the principal concern in thinking 
about justice was distribution. Later, with the rise of the new social movements 
and multiculturalism, the center of gravity shifted to recognition. In both cases, 
the modern territorial state was assumed by default. As a result, the political di-
mension of justice was relegated to the margins. Where it did emerge, it took the 
ordinary-political form of contests over the decision rules internal to the polity, 
whose boundaries were taken for granted. Thus, claims for gender quotas and 
multicultural rights sought to remove political obstacles to participatory parity for 
those who were already included in principle in the political community.8 Taking 
for granted the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, they did not call into question the 
assumption that the appropriate unit of justice was the territorial state.
 Today, in contrast, globalization has put the question of the frame squarely 
on the political agenda. Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian-West-
phalian frame is now considered by many to be a major vehicle of injustice, as 
it partitions political space in ways that block many who are poor and despised 
from challenging the forces that oppress them. Channeling their claims into the 
domestic political spaces of relatively powerless, if not wholly failed, states, this 
frame insulates offshore powers from critique and control.9 Among those shielded 
from the reach of justice are more powerful predator states and transnational 
private powers, including foreign investors and creditors, international currency 
speculators, and transnational corporations. Also protected are the governance 
structures of the global economy, which set exploitative terms of interaction and 
then exempt them from democratic control.10 Finally, the Keynesian-Westphalian 
  8. Among the best accounts of the normative force of these struggles are Will Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (London: Oxford University Press, 
1995) and Melissa Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of 
Liberal Representation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
  9. Thomas W. Pogge, “The Influence of the Global Order on the Prospects for Genuine De-
mocracy in the Developing Countries”, Ratio Juris 14, 3 (2001): 326-343; and “Economic Justice 
and National Borders”, Revision 22, 2 (1999): 27-34. Rainer Forst, “Towards a Critical Theory of 
Transnational Justice”, in Global Justice, ed. Thomas Pogge (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 
189-187; and “Justice, Morality and Power in the Global Context”, unpublished ms., 10 pp. Richard L. 
Harris and Melinda J. Seid, Critical Perspectives on Globalization and Neoliberalism in the Developing 
Countries, (Boston: Leiden, 2000). Ankie M.M. Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Post Colonial World: 
The Political Economy of Development (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001).
 10. Robert W. Cox, “A Perspective on Globalization”, in Globalization: Critical Reflections, 
ed. James H. Mittelman (Lynne Rienner, 1996), 21-30; and “Democracy in Hard Times: Economic 
Globalization and the Limits to Liberal Democracy”, in The Transformation of Democracy? ed. Anthony 
McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press 1997), 49-72. Stephen Gill, “New Constitutionalism, Democrati-
sation and Global Political Economy”, Pacifica Review 10, 1 (February 1998): 23-38. Eric Helleiner, 
“From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: A World Turned Upside Down”, in Political Economy and the 
Changing Global Order, ed. Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R. D. Underhill (St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 
163-175. David Schneiderman, “Investment Rules and the Rule of Law”, Constellations 8, 4 (2001): 
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frame is self-insulating; the architecture of the interstate system protects the very 
partitioning of political space that it institutionalizes, effectively excluding trans-
national democratic decision-making on issues of justice.11 
 From this perspective, the Keynesian-Westphalian frame is a powerful instru-
ment of injustice, which gerrymanders political space at the expense of the poor 
and despised. For those persons who are denied the chance to press transnational 
first-order claims, struggles against maldistribution and misrecognition cannot 
proceed, let alone succeed, unless they are joined with struggles against misfram-
ing. It is not surprising, therefore, that some consider misframing the defining 
injustice of a globalizing age. 
 Under these conditions, of heightened awareness of misframing, the politi-
cal dimension of justice is hard to ignore. Insofar as globalization is politicizing 
the question of the frame, it is also making visible an aspect of the grammar of 
justice that was often neglected in the previous period. It is now apparent that no 
claim for justice can avoid presupposing some notion of representation, implicit 
or explicit, insofar as none can avoid assuming a frame. Thus, representation is 
always already inherent in all claims for redistribution and recognition. The po-
litical dimension is implicit in, indeed required by, the grammar of the concept 
of justice. The point can also be put in the form of a slogan: No redistribution or 
recognition without representation.
 In general, then, an adequate theory of justice for our time must be three-
dimensional. Encompassing not only redistribution and recognition, but also 
representation, it must allow us to grasp the question of the frame as a question 
of justice. Incorporating the economic, cultural, and political dimensions, it must 
enable us to identify injustices of misframing and to evaluate possible remedies. 
Above all, it must permit us to pose, and to answer, the key political question of 
our age: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecognition, 
and misrepresentation within a postwestphalian frame?
521-537.  Alfred C. Aman, Jr., “Globalization, Democracy and the Need for a New Administrative 
Law”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 10, 1 (2003): 125-155.  Servaes Storm and J. Mohan 
Rao, “Market-Led Globalization and World Democracy: Can the Twain Ever Meet?” Development 
and Change 35, 5 (2004): 567-581. James K. Boyce, “Democratizing Global Economic Governance”, 
Development and Change 35, 3 (2004): 593-599.
 11. John Dryzek, “Transnational Democracy, Journal of Political Philosophy 7,1 (1999): 30-51. 
James Bohman, “International Regimes and Democratic Governance”, International Affairs 75, 3 (1999): 
499-513. David Held, “Regulating Globalization?” International Journal of Sociology 15, 2 (2000): 394-
408; Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995), 99-140; “The Transformation of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in 
the Context of Globalization”, in Democracy’s Edges, ed. Ian Shapiro and Cassiano Hacker-Cordón 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 84-111; “Cosmopolitanism: Globalization Tamed?” 
Review of International Studies 29, 4 (2003), 465-480; and “Democratic Accountability and Political 
Effectiveness from a Cosmopolitan Perspective”, Government and Opposition 39, 2 (2004): 364-391.
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2. ON THE POLITICS OF FRAMING: FROM STATE-TERRITORIALITY TO 
SOCIAL EFFECTIVITY?
 So far I have been arguing for the irreducible specificity of the political as one 
of three fundamental dimensions of justice. And I have identified two distinct levels 
of political injustice: ordinary-political misrepresentation and misframing. Now, 
I want to examine the politics of framing in a globalizing world. Distinguishing 
affirmative from transformative approaches, I shall argue that an adequate politics 
of representation must also address a third level: beyond contesting ordinary-po-
litical misrepresentation, on the one hand, and misframing, on the other, such a 
politics must also aim to democratize the process of frame-setting.
 I begin by explaining what I mean by “the politics of framing”. Situated 
at my second level, where distinctions between members and nonmembers are 
drawn, this politics concerns the boundary-setting aspect of the political. Focused 
on the issues of who counts as a subject of justice, and what is the appropriate 
frame, the politics of framing comprises efforts to establish and consolidate, to 
contest and revise, the authoritative division of political space. Included here are 
struggles against misframing, which aim to dismantle the obstacles that prevent 
disadvantaged people from confronting the forces that oppress them with claims 
of justice. Centered on the setting and contesting of frames, the politics of fram-
ing is concerned with the question of the “who”.
 The politics of framing can take two distinct forms, both of which are now 
being practiced in our globalizing world.12 The first approach, which I shall call 
the affirmative politics of framing, contests the boundaries of existing frames while 
accepting the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting. In this politics, those who 
claim to suffer injustices of misframing seek to redraw the boundaries of existing 
territorial states or in some cases to create new ones. But they still assume that the 
territorial state is the appropriate unit within which to pose and resolve disputes 
about justice. For them accordingly, injustices of misframing are not a function of 
the general principle according to which the Westphalian order partitions political 
space. They arise, rather, as a result of the faulty way in which that principle has 
been applied. Thus, those who practice the affirmative politics of framing accept 
that the principle of state-territoriality is the proper basis for constituting the 
“who” of justice. They agree, in other words, that what makes a given collection of 
individuals into fellow subjects of justice is their shared residence on the territory 
of a modern state and/or their shared membership in the political community that 
corresponds to such a state. Thus, far from challenging the underlying grammar 
 12. In distinguishing “affirmative” from “transformative” approaches, I am adapting termino-
logy I have used in the past with respect to redistribution and recognition. See Nancy Fraser, “From 
Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Postsocialist’ Age”, New Left Review 212 
(1995): 68-93; and “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and 
Participation”, op. cit.
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of the Westphalian order, those who practice the affirmative politics of framing 
accept its state-territorial principle.13
 Precisely that principle is contested, however, in a second version of the poli-
tics of framing, which I shall call the transformative approach. For proponents of 
this approach, the state-territorial principle no longer affords an adequate basis for 
determining the “who” of justice in every case. They concede, of course, that that 
principle remains relevant for many purposes; thus, supporters of transformation 
do not propose to eliminate state-territoriality entirely. But they contend that its 
grammar is out of synch with the structural causes of many injustices in a global-
izing world, which are not territorial in character. Examples include the financial 
markets, “offshore factories”, investment regimes, and governance structures of 
the global economy, which determine who works for a wage and who does not; the 
information networks of global media and cybertechnology, which determine who 
is included in the circuits of communicative power and who is not; and the bio-
politics of climate, disease, drugs, weapons, and biotechnology, which determine 
who will live long and who will die young. In these matters, so fundamental to 
human well-being, the forces that perpetrate injustice belong not to “the space of 
places”, but to “the space of flows”.14 Not locatable within the jurisdiction of any 
actual or conceivable territorial state, they cannot be made answerable to claims of 
justice that are framed in terms of the state-territorial principle. In their case, so 
the argument goes, to invoke the state-territorial principle to determine the frame 
is itself to commit an injustice. By partitioning political space along territorial 
lines, this principle insulates extra— and non-territorial powers from the reach 
of justice. In a globalizing world, therefore, it is less likely to serve as a remedy 
for misframing than as means of inflicting or perpetuating it.
 In general, then, the transformative politics of framing aims to change the 
deep grammar of frame-setting in a globalizing world. This approach seeks to 
supplement the state-territorial principle of the Westphalian order with one or 
more postwestphalian principles. The aim is to overcome injustices of misframing 
 13. For the state-territorial principle, see Thomas Baldwin, “The Territorial State”, in Jurispru-
dence, Cambridge Essays, ed. H. Gross and T. R. Harrison (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 207-230. 
For doubts about the state-territorial principle (among other principles), see Frederick Whelan, “De-
mocratic Theory and the Boundary Problem”, in Nomos XXV: Liberal Democracy, ed. J. R. Pennock 
and R. W. Chapman (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), 13-47. For accounts 
of the pathos inherent in affirmative struggles against misframing, see: Frantz Fanon, “On National 
Culture”, in Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove, 1963), 165-199. Tom Nairn, “The 
Modern Janus,” in Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: NLB, 1977), 
329-363.  Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1993). For the gender dimension of such struggles, see: Anne McClintock, “Family 
Feuds: Gender, Nation and the Family, Feminist Review 44 (1993): 61-80; Deniz Kandiyoti, “Identity 
and its Discontents: Women and the Nation”, in Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A 
Reader, ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 
376-391; and Nira Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation (London: Sage Publications, 1997).
 14. Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1996): 
440-460.
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by changing not just the boundaries of the “who” of justice, but also the mode of 
their constitution, hence the way in which they are drawn.15
 What might a postwestphalian mode of frame-setting look like? Doubtless it 
is too early to have a clear view. Nevertheless, the most promising candidate so 
far is the “all-affected principle”. This principle holds that all those affected by a 
given social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of justice in 
relation to it. On this view, what turns a collection of people into fellow subjects 
of justice is not geographical proximity, but their co-imbrication in a common 
structural or institutional framework, which sets the ground rules that govern their 
social interaction, thereby shaping their respective life possibilities, in patterns of 
advantage and disadvantage. 
 Until recently, the all-affected principle seemed to coincide in the eyes of many 
with the state-territorial principle. It was assumed, in keeping with the Westphalian 
world picture, that the common framework that determined patterns of advantage 
and disadvantage was precisely the constitutional order of the modern territorial 
state. As a result, it seemed that in applying the state-territorial principle, one si-
multaneously captured the normative force of the all-affected principle. In fact, this 
was never truly so, as the long history of colonialism and neocolonialism attests. 
From the perspective of the metropole, however, the conflation of state-territorial-
ity with social effectivity appeared to have an emancipatory thrust, as it served 
to justify the progressive incorporation, as subjects of justice, of the subordinate 
classes and status groups who were resident on the territory but excluded from 
active citizenship. 
 Today, however, the idea that state-territoriality can serve as a proxy for social 
effectivity is no longer plausible. Under current conditions, one’s chances to live 
a good life do not depend wholly on the internal political constitution of the ter-
ritorial state in which one resides. Although the latter remains undeniably relevant, 
its effects are mediated by other structures, both extra- and non-territorial, whose 
impact is at least as significant.16 In general, globalization is driving a widening 
wedge between state territoriality and social effectivity. As those two principles 
increasingly diverge, the effect is to reveal the former as an inadequate surrogate 
for the latter. And so the question arises: is it possible to apply the all-affected 
 15. I owe the idea of a post-territorial “mode of political differentiation” to John G. Ruggie. 
See his immensely suggestive essay, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in Inter-
national Relations”, International Organization 47 (1993): 139-74. Also suggestive in this regard is 
Raul C. Pangalangan, “Territorial Sovereignty: Command, Title, and Expanding the Claims of the 
Commons”, in Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives, ed. David Miller and Sohail H. 
Hashmi (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 164-182. 
 16. Thomas W. Pogge, World and Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities 
and Reforms (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), especially the sections on “The Causal Role of Global 
Institutions in the Persistence of Severe Poverty”, 112-116, and “Explanatory Nationalism: The Deep 
Significance of National Borders”, 139-144. Rainer Forst, “Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational 
Justice”, op. cit.; and “Justice, Morality and Power in the Global Context”, op. cit.
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principle directly to the framing of justice, without going through the detour of 
state-territoriality? 
 This is precisely what some practitioners of transformative politics are seek-
ing to do. Seeking leverage against offshore sources of maldistribution and mis-
recognition, some globalization activists are appealing directly to the all-affected 
principle in order to circumvent the state-territorial partitioning of political space. 
Contesting their exclusion by the Keynesian-Westphalian frame, environmentalists 
and indigenous peoples are claiming standing as subjects of justice in relation to 
the extra- and non-territorial powers that impact their lives. Insisting that effectiv-
ity trumps state-territoriality, they have joined development activists, international 
feminists, and others in asserting their right to make claims against the structures 
that harm them, even when the latter cannot be located in the space of places. 
Casting off the Westphalian grammar of frame-setting, these claimants are applying 
the all-affected principle directly to questions of justice in a globalizing world. 17
 In such cases, the transformative politics of framing proceeds simultaneously 
in multiple dimensions and on multiple levels.18 On one level, the social movements 
that practice this politics aim to redress first-order injustices of maldistribution, 
misrecognition, and ordinary-political misrepresentation. On a second level, these 
movements seek to redress meta-level injustices of misframing by reconstituting 
the “who” of justice. In those cases, moreover, where the state-territorial principle 
serves more to indemnify than to challenge injustice, transformative social move-
ments appeal instead to the all-affected principle. Invoking a postwestphalian prin-
ciple, they are seeking to change the very grammar of frame-setting–and thereby 
to reconstruct the meta-political foundations of justice for a globalizing world.
 But the claims of transformative politics go further still. In addition to appealing 
to a postwestphalian principle, this politics is also inaugurating a postwestphalian 
process of frame-setting. Above and beyond their other claims, then, these move-
ments are also claiming a say in the process of frame-setting. Rejecting the stan-
dard view, which deems frame-setting the prerogative of states and transnational 
elites, they are effectively aiming to democratize the process by which the frames 
of justice are drawn and revised. Asserting their right to participate in constituting 
the “who” of justice, they are simultaneously transforming the “how”–by which I 
mean the accepted procedures for determining the “who”. At their most reflective 
and ambitious, accordingly, transformative movements are demanding the creation 
 17. Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity (London: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). John A 
Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy and Mayer N. Zald, “Globalizations and Social Movements”, op. cit. 
Sanjeev Khagram, Kathryn Sikkink and James V. Riker, Restructuring World Politics: Transnational 
Social Movements, Networks, and Norms, op. cit. Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists 
Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, op. cit. Jeffrey St. Clair, “Seattle Diary”, 
op. cit.
 18. For a useful account, which differs from the one presented here, see Christine Chin and 
James H. Mittelman, “Conceptualizing Resistance to Globalisation”, New Political Economy 2, 1 
(1997): 25-37.
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of new democratic arenas for entertaining arguments about the frame. In some 
cases, moreover, they are creating such arenas themselves. In the World Social 
Forum, for example, some practitioners of transformative politics have fashioned 
a transnational public sphere where they can participate on a par with others in 
airing and resolving disputes about the frame.19 In this way, they are prefiguring 
the possibility of new institutions of postwestphalian democratic justice.
 The democratizing dimension of transformative politics points to a third level 
of political injustice, above and beyond the two previously discussed. Previously, 
I distinguished first-order injustices of ordinary-political misrepresentation from 
second-order injustices of misframing. Now, however, we can discern a third-order 
species of political injustice, which corresponds to the question of the “how”. 
Exemplified by undemocratic processes of frame-setting, this injustice consists in 
the failure to institutionalize parity of participation at the meta-political level, in 
deliberations and decisions concerning the “who”. Because what is at stake here 
is the process by which first-order political space is constituted, I shall call this 
injustice meta-political misrepresentation. Meta-political misrepresentation arises 
when states and transnational elites monopolize the activity of frame-setting, de-
nying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, and blocking creation of 
democratic fora where the latter’s claims can be vetted and redressed. The effect 
is to exclude the overwhelming majority of people from participation in the meta-
discourses that determine the authoritative division of political space. Lacking 
any institutional arenas for such participation, and submitted to an undemocratic 
approach to the “how”, the majority is denied the chance to engage on terms of 
parity in decision-making about the “who”. 
 In general, then, struggles against misframing are revealing a new kind of 
democratic deficit. Just as globalization has made visible injustices of misfram-
ing, so transformative struggles against neoliberal globalization are making visible 
the injustice of meta-political misrepresentation. Exposing the lack of institutions 
where disputes about the “who” can be democratically aired and resolved, these 
struggles are focusing attention on the “how”. By demonstrating that the absence 
of such institutions impedes efforts to overcome injustice, they are revealing the 
deep internal connections between democracy and justice. The effect is to bring 
to light a structural feature of the current conjuncture: struggles for justice in a 
globalizing world cannot succeed unless they go hand in hand with struggles for 
meta-political democracy. At this level, too, then: no redistribution or recognition 
without representation. 
 19. James Bohman, “The Globalization of the Public Sphere: Cosmopolitanism Publicity and 
Cultural Pluralism”, Modern Schoolman 75,2 (1998): 101-117. John A Guidry, Michael D. Kennedy 
and Mayer N. Zald, “Globalizations and Social Movements”, op. cit. Thomas Pomiah, “Democracy vs. 
Empire: Alternatives to Globalization Presented at the World Social Forum”, Antipode 36, 1 (2004), 
130-133. Maria Pia Lara, “Building Up Diasporic Global Spheres,” unpublished ms. on file with au-
thor. Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere”, in Globalizing Critical Theory, ed. Max 
Pensky (Totowa NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming). 
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3. PARADIGM SHIFT: POSTWESTPHALIAN DEMOCRATIC JUSTICE
 I have been arguing that what distinguishes the current conjuncture is inten-
sified contestation concerning both the “who” and the “how” of justice.  Under 
these conditions, the theory of justice is undergoing a paradigm shift. Earlier, when 
the Keynesian-Westphalian frame was in place, most philosophers neglected the 
political dimension. Treating the territorial-state as a given, they endeavored to 
ascertain the requirements of justice theoretically, in a monological fashion. Thus, 
they did not envision any role in determining those requirements for those who 
would be subject to them, let alone for those who would be excluded by the na-
tional frame. Neglecting to reflect on the question of the frame, these philosophers 
never imagined that those whose fates would be so decisively shaped by framing 
decisions might be entitled to participate in making them. Disavowing any need 
for a dialogical democratic moment, they were content to produce monological 
theories of social justice.
 Today, however, monological theories of social justice are becoming increas-
ingly implausible. As we have seen, globalization cannot help but problematize 
the question of the “how”, as it politicizes the question of the “who”. The process 
goes something like this: as the circle of those claiming a say in frame-setting 
expands, decisions about the “who” are increasingly viewed as political matters, 
which should be handled democratically, rather than as technical matters, which 
can be left to experts and elites. The effect is to shift the burden of argument, 
requiring defenders of expert privilege to make their case. No longer able to hold 
themselves above the fray, they are necessarily embroiled in disputes about the 
“how”. As a result, they must contend with demands for meta-political democra-
tization.
 An analogous shift is currently making itself felt in normative philosophy. 
Just as some activists are seeking to transfer elite frame-setting prerogatives to 
democratic publics, so some theorists of justice are proposing to rethink the clas-
sic division of labor between theorist and demos. No longer content to ascertain 
the requirements of justice in a monological fashion, these theorists are looking 
increasingly to dialogical approaches, which treat important aspects of justice as 
matters for collective decision-making, to be determined by the citizens themselves, 
through democratic deliberation. For them, accordingly, the grammar of the theory 
of justice is being transformed. What could once be called the “theory of social 
justice” now appears as the “theory of democratic justice”, to cite Ian Shapiro’s 
apt phrase. 20
 In its current form, however, the theory of democratic justice remains incomplete. 
To complete the shift from a monological to dialogical theory requires a further 
step, beyond those envisioned by Shapiro and other proponents of the dialogical 
 20. Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999). 
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turn.21 Henceforth, democratic processes of determination must be applied not 
only to the “what” of justice, but also to the “who” and the “how”. In that case, 
by adopting a democratic approach to the “how”, the theory of justice assumes a 
guise appropriate to a globalizing world: dialogical at every level, meta-political 
as well as ordinary-political, it becomes a theory of postwestphalian democratic 
justice.22
 The view of justice as participatory parity lends itself easily to such an ap-
proach. This principle has a double quality that expresses the reflexive character 
of democratic justice. On the one hand, the principle of participatory parity is an 
outcome notion, which specifies a substantive principle of justice by which we 
may evaluate social arrangements: the latter are just if and only if they permit 
all the relevant social actors to participate as peers in social life. On the other 
hand, participatory parity is also a process notion, which specifies a procedural 
standard by which we may evaluate the democratic legitimacy of norms: the latter 
are legitimate if and only if they can command the assent of all concerned in fair 
and open processes of deliberation, in which all can participate as peers. By virtue 
of this double quality, the view of justice as participatory parity has an inherent 
reflexivity. Able to problematize both substance and procedure, it renders visible 
the mutual entwinement of those two aspects of social arrangements. Thus, this 
approach can expose both the unjust background conditions that skew putatively 
democratic decision-making and the undemocratic procedures that generate sub-
stantively unequal outcomes. As a result, it enables us to shift levels easily, moving 
back and forth as necessary between first-order and meta-level questions. Making 
manifest the co-implication of democracy and justice, the view of justice as par-
ticipatory parity supplies just the sort of reflexivity that is needed in a globalizing 
world.
 Let me conclude by recalling the principal features of the theory of justice that 
I have sketched here. An account of postwestphalian democratic justice, this theory 
encompasses three fundamental dimensions, economic, cultural, and political. As a 
result, it renders visible, and criticizable, the mutual entwinement of maldistribu-
tion, misrecognition and misrepresentation. In addition, this theory’s account of 
political injustice encompasses three levels. Addressing not only ordinary-politi-
cal misrepresentation, but also misframing and meta-political misrepresentation, 
 21. Important arguments for dialogical theorizing can also be found in Jürgen Habermas, Bet-
ween Facts and Norms, op. cit. However, neither Shapiro nor Habermas has attempted to apply the 
“democratic justice” approach to the problem of the frame. One dialogical theorist who appreciates 
the importance of framing is Rainer Forst. See his, Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy Beyond 
Liberalism and Communitarianism, trans. J. M. M. Farrell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2002); “Towards a Critical Theory of Transnational Justice”, op. cit., and “Justice, Morality and 
Power in the Global Context”, op. cit. But even Forst, who seems to me to come closest to the view 
proposed here, does not envision democratic processes of frame-setting.
 22. For a suggestive treatment of these issues, see James Bohman, “International Regimes and 
Democratic Governance”, op. cit.
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it allows us to grasp the problem of the frame as a matter of justice. Focused not 
only on the “what” of justice, but also on the “who” and the “how”, it enables us 
to evaluate the justice of alternative principles and alternative processes of frame-
setting. Above all, as I noted before, the theory of postwestphalian democratic 
justice encourages us to pose, and hopefully to answer, the key political question 
of our time: how can we integrate struggles against maldistribution, misrecogni-
tion, and misrepresentation within a postwestphalian frame?

